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PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
SHOULD DEATH ROW INMATES BE ABLE TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEATH
Nicholas Compton
On June 13, 1997, Timothy McVeigh was sentenced to death for the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on
April 19,1995. 73 The bombing resulted in the deaths of 168 people and
the wounding of over 500 more. 74 McVeigh successfully petitioned U.S.
District Court Judge Richard Matsch to put an end to his appeals and
expedite his execution. At midnight on February 16, 2001 McVeigh let
pass his deadline to petition President George W. Bush for clemency. 75
He is scheduled to die by lethal injection on May 16, 2001 at the federal
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana. 76
Only eight seats are available in the Terre Haute facility for witnesses
on behalf of the victims of the bombing. 77 However, approximately 250
survivors of the bombing and family members of those who died have
asked for permission to witness the execution.78  In order to
accommodate all the victims and their families, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons is considering a closed-circuit broadcast of the execution. 79
McVeigh, however, claims that broadcasting his execution only on
closed-circuit television raises fundamental equal access concerns, and
has therefore asked that his execution be publicly broadcast.80 The
Bureau of Prisons quickly rejected his request with the statement. It
hasn't been considered. It won't happen. 81
73. Cable News Network, Jurors reach verdict on McVeigh's fate (last modified June 13, 1997),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9706/13/mcveigh.sentence/index.html.
74. Cable News Network, Judge says McVeigh can drop appeals (last modified Dec. 28, 2000),
http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/12/28/mcveig.hearing.03/index.html.
75. Id.
76. Cable News Network, Mc Veigh wants execution publicly broadcast (last modified Feb. 11, 2001),
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/02/11/mcveighletter.ap/index.html (prior to publication of this article,
newly discovered FBI documents resulted in a postponement of McVeigh's execution until June 11,
2001).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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McVeigh's request has once again raised the issue of public executions
in America. In particular, the request has raised the question of whether
or not the death penalty should be broadcast via television into the
living rooms of the American public. This article will discuss the history
of public executions in America, the arguments for and against public
executions, and the reasons why inmates should have the option of
dying in public or behind closed doors.
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC EXECUTION IN AMERICA
Capital punishment was brought to the Americas by European
settlers.8 2 The first recorded execution in the new colonies was of
Captain George Kendall in the Jamestown colony of Virginia in 1608.83
Subsequent executions were typically held in a public forum and were for
such offenses as striking one's mother or father, or denying the A true
God.8
4
Beginning in the early 1800s, at approximately the same time states
were restricting the number of crimes that were punishable by death,
these same states were also turning away from public executions in favor
of what they considered more humane private executions. 85 Following
these trends, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Holden v.
Minnesota,86 that states could, in [their] wisdom, and for the public
good, prohibit public and media access to state executions. 87 The
Supreme Court put a halt to all executions in the United States in 1972
with its decision in Furman v. Georgia.88 In invalidating 40 89state death
penalty statutes, the Furman court said that states could maintain their
death penalty regimes only if they carried out prisoner executions in an
organized manner and within the privacy and confines of prison walls.90
The Furman decision was an invitation to the states to rewrite their
death penalty statutes. Four years after Furman, the Court issued its
82. Death Penalty Information Center, History of the Death Penalty (last visited Feb. 16, 2001),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/history2.htnil.
83. Id.
84. Philip R. Weise, Comment, Popcorn and Primetime vs. Protocol: An Examination of the Televised
Execution Issue, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 257, 260 (1996).
85. Weise, at 260.
86. See 137 U.S. 483 (1890).
87. See Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 (1890).
88. , 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 10.
89. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 10.
90. Weise, supra note 12, at 262.
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opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,91 holding that new death penalty statutes
written in Florida, Georgia, and Texas were constitutional under the 8th
Amendment. 9
2
In his article on televised executions, Philip R. Wiese discusses three
categories into which modern state death penalty regimes, have tended
to fall. 93The most restrictive category only allows individuals acting in
an official capacity, or individuals chosen by the inmate himself, to
witness the execution. 94 The second category is less restrictive than the
first in that the state merely restricts the number of people attending
the execution and not specifically who can attend the execution. 95 The
third and most common category is a hybrid of the first two; states
employing this regime provide for a fixed number of witnesses to the
execution, but in that number is included certain slots reserved for
members of the media.9
6
Even though the third category allowing the media to witness an
execution is the most prevalent in the United States, Weise points out
that no state has yet to allow reporters to use video or audio equipment
in the witness room. 97 This position stems from two federal court
decisions in the mid-1970s. In the first case, Pell v. Procunier,98
journalists and prison inmates brought suit in the Northern District of
California attacking the constitutionality of a state regulation that
prohibited face-to-face interviews between the news media and the
inmates. The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not generally available to the public. 99 Three years later, in
Garrett v. Estelle,100 a news cameraman brought suit seeking to force the
state of Texas to allow him to film an execution for broadcast on
television. The Fifth Circuit found that the news media had no
constitutionally protected right to record an execution. 10 1 From these
two cases, states codified their policies on media coverage of executions.
91. See 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
92. Death Penalty Information Center, note 10.
93. Weise, supra note 12, at 262.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
99. Id. at 833.
100. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977)
101. Id. at 1279.
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Most execution states allow journalists into the witness room. However,
the states regulate the number of journalists viewing any one execution
and what the journalist may bring into the witness room no video
equipment, no audio equipment, pad and paper provided by the prison.
Of course, the news media was not prepared to let the issue of public
executions die with Garrett. Three court cases between 1977 and the
present illustrate the attempts of the news media to bring executions to
the public through television and the judiciary's attempts to quash any
such broadcasts. The first case is Halquist v. Department of
Corrections.10 2 In this case, petitioner Halquist sought permission to
videotape an execution for broadcast on the grounds that citizens of
Washington State have a constitutional right to attend executions and
that journalists who witness executions have a constitutional right to
videotape them.10 3 The Supreme Court of Washington State held that:
1) the Constitution of Washington State only protects fundamental
inalienable rights, of which attending and videotaping an execution are
not, and 2) the Constitution of the United States does not prevent states
from restricting access to information not generally available to the
public nor does it require states to show a compelling state interest
before restricting media access to information.10 4
In the second case, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez,10 5 here, KQED, a PBS
station in California, argued that it had a First Amendment right to
videotape an execution and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim because the state regulation prohibiting video cameras in the
witness room prevented the KQED reporters from using the tool of
their trade.106 Vasquez, the warden of San Quentin Prison at the time,
put forth three arguments against KQED's claims. Vasquez argued: 1) the
ban on cameras in the witness room protected the identity of prison
employees involved in the execution from angry inmates and an angry
public, 2) broadcasting an execution would incite violence in the prison,
thereby threatening prison employees, and 3) video cameras could be
used to break the heavy glass surrounding the gas chamber thereby
threatening the lives of those individuals in the witness room.107 The
102. 113 Wash.2d 818 (1989)
103. Id. at 820.
104. See Halquist, 113 Wash. at 822.
105. See 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21163.
106. See KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21163, at *6
(N.D. Cal. June 7, 1991).
107. Id. at *7.
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California
found persuasive Vasquez's arguments for not letting KQED videotape
an execution. 108 The Court held that the right of a witness to an
execution, under California law, was simply to witness, not to
videotape.109
The third case is Lawson v. Dixon. 110 This case is famous because
Lawson wished to have his execution televised on the Phil Donahue
show; Mr. Donahue is also a plaintiff in this case. Lawson, Donahue, and
Arnold, a third plaintiff, argued the same First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims that KQED argued two years earlier when it
attempted to videotape and broadcast an execution.111 Dixon, a warden
of the North Carolina prison where Lawson was being held, put forth the
same arguments that Vasquez had put forth earlier. 112 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina reached the same holding as the U.S. District
Court found in KQED: the prison warden had valid reasons for excluding
video cameras from the witness room and more importantly, the
plaintiffs had no valid First or Fourteenth Amendment claims.113
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, while not required to
address the merits of Lawson's claim, called into question the validity of
the North Carolina Supreme Court's determination that Lawson did not
have any constitutional guarantee to either 1) select those persons
whom he wished to witness his execution, or 2) to require that his
execution be filmed. 114
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PUBLIC EXECUTION
In his article, Weise gleans from the cases mentioned above several
arguments in support of televised executions and several arguments in
opposition to televised executions. Wiese suggests that proponents of
public executions typically rely on four central arguments in support of
their position.115 The first argument, as evidenced by the above cases,
asserts that televised executions are mandated by the First and
108. Id. at *12.
109. Id.
110. See 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594 (1994).
111. See KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21163, at *11.
112. See Lawson v. Dixon, No. 94-6640, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594, at *2 (4th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. at *4.
115. Id. at *15; Weise, supra note 12, at 268-270.
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 116 Clearly,
the courts have rejected this argument. Fortunately, proponents have
other arguments to proffer. The second argument asserts that televised
executions ought to be legally mandated because of the potential
deterrent effect on future criminal offenders. 7 The third argument
asserts that televised executions ought to be legally mandated to fully
educate the public about the political and physical effects of capital
punishment. 8 The final argument asserts that televised executions
ought to be legally mandated in order to show the public at large that
swift and certain punishment is being carried out by the state.119
Wiese also lists several arguments proffered by opponents of televised
executions. This list not only includes the arguments put forth in the
KQED and Lawson cases above,1 20 but also these arguments: 1) it would
be shocking and upsetting to viewers;1 21 2) it would be tasteless
entertainment;1 22 3) it would make the inmate appear as the victim; 123
4) the inmate should have some right of privacy to protect his death
from indignity;1 24 5) there is insufficient space within the execution
chamber. 125
As Wiese correctly points out, the arguments in support of televised
executions, based on the cases above, will always be rejected in favor of
the arguments in opposition to televised executions, otherwise termed
compelling state interests.1 26 In other words, if the arguments against
public execution can be framed in a compelling state interest context,
then they will prevail. Likewise, if the arguments in favor of public
execution outweigh a compelling state interest, then they will prevail.
Clearly, most courts have found that First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims-as well as any other claims brought forth thus far by televised
execution proponents-do not outweigh the compelling state interest
of, for example, preventing a backlash against the prison officials
performing the execution. Therefore, any request to televise an
116. Weise, supra note 12, at 270.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Weise, supra note 12, at 270.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 272.
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execution is apparently dead on arrival.
IN SUPPORT OF TELEVISED EXECUTIONS
As stated above, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Lawson v.
Dixon, while not required to address the merits of Lawson's request for
an televised execution, did call into question the rulings of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. 127 Specifically, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that Lawson did not have a guaranteed constitutional right to
have his execution televised. 12 However, as the Court of Appeals notes,
the North Carolina Supreme Court based its decision on a series of cases
that dealt with the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of journalists
in attempting to gain access to executions in order to film them. 129
Lawson's claims though are based on his First Amendment right to
freedom of expression and the restrictions based on his freedom to
communicate his message via videotape. 130 While the Fourth Circuit did
not discuss the validity of Lawson's claims, the court did say that the
state offered no evidence for its prohibition against allowing a video
recording of Lawson's execution. 131 This decision seems to indicate that
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in support of televised
executions may succeed if they are brought on behalf of the condemned
inmate and not on behalf of the journalists wishing to film the
execution. The difference in Lawson, as opposed to Halquist or KQED,
is that in Lawson the condemned inmate himself was requesting the
broadcast of the execution the request was not coming from journalists.
Therefore, the issue becomes not the rights of the journalists but the
rights of the inmate.
The Court in Lawson, pointed out that the state had produced no
evidence justifying its ban on televised executions. 132 Recall that the
state must show a compelling interest in maintaining the ban; if the state
shows a compelling state interest, it will prevail. 133 The arguments listed
by Weise as typical arguments for opponents of televised execution are
generally thought to be winning arguments in terms of compelling state
127. Id.
128. Weise, supra note 12, at 273.
129. Id. at 269.
130. Id.
131. Lawson v. Dixon, No. 94-6640, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594, at *16 (4th Cir. 1994).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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interests. 134 Again, these arguments include: 1) the media has no right to
access beyond that of the general public; 2) photographed prison
officials could be subject to retribution; 3) prisoners may riot; 4) cameras
could be used to damage the gas chamber; 5) it would be shocking and
upsetting to viewers; 6) it would be tasteless entertainment; 7) it would
make the inmate appear as the victim; 8) the inmate should have some
right of privacy to protect his death from indignity; 9) there is
insufficient space within the execution chamber. 135 These arguments are
seen as winners for states wishing to prohibit the broadcast of
executions.
However, the argument could be made that several, if not all, of the
nine arguments could be neutralized so as not to invoke a compelling
state interest? For example, argument number eight, referring to the
privacy of the inmate, and argument number one, referring to the right
of access of the public and the press, both become moot when the
inmate himself requests that execution be televised. Similarly, several
arguments could be addressed while still accommodating the inmate's
First Amendment rights. For example, the faces of prison officials on
the videotape could be blocked out prior to broadcast, prisoners could be
prohibited from watching the broadcast, security officials could be
present in the witness room to prevent the suicidal cameraman from
damaging the gas chamber with his camera, the victims of the inmate's
crime could have their story told, and additional space could be provided
to accommodate witnesses, media representatives, and camera
equipment. As for the arguments that the execution would be shocking
and tasteless, these seem to be arguments less in support of any
compelling state interest, and more an effort to prevent any political
opposition to the death penalty. Capital punishment is gruesome, but if
television viewers wish not to see an execution, they can simply change
the channel. The fact that some viewers may be emotionally affected by
an execution should not prohibit an inmate or the press from exercising
their First Amendment rights.
Therefore, if the condemned inmate himself requests his execution be
televised and all compelling state interests are neutralized, then courts
may be willing to grant the request for broadcast. However, neutralizing
all compelling state interests to the satisfaction of the court may be a
difficult, if not impossible, task. Also, as a public policy matter, courts
134. Id.
135. Id.
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may simply be unwilling to allow a televised execution to occur and will
therefore go out their way to prevent it from happening.
CONCLUSION
Timothy McVeigh has not made a formal request to have his
execution televised, but the convicted Oklahoma City bomber has
questioned the fairness of limiting the number of witnesses to his
execution. 136 Given the crime for which McVeigh was convicted, it
seems logical to assume that his motives in wishing to have his
execution televised are simply to undermine the legitimacy of the
federal government by broadcasting a horrific act that the government
sanctions. However, if the government sanctions such an act, then by
definition (at least in this country), the people sanction it. Clearly, if
the public wishes to continue to sanction executions, it is going to have
to come to grips with the nature of the procedure. It is gruesome.
Executions behind closed doors serve one legitimate purpose; that is
protecting the privacy and the dignity of the condemned individual. For
that reason, courts have rightly held that prisoners cannot be forced into
public executions.
However, for those individuals who wish to have a public execution,
courts should not stand in their way. The public has a right to know the
true nature of a procedure it sanctions. Moreover, public executions
serve as a check on the prison officials conducting the execution. If the
public is going to sanction an execution, it should be assured that the
execution is being carried out in as humane a manner as possible given
the situation. If the procedure is gruesome, so be it. If execution horror
stories 137 are shown on television, then so be it. The public has a right to
know what it is authorizing. Some people may find the procedure
barbaric and may be moved to protest further executions. Some people
may see the execution as a just and rightful end to a barbaric human
being. Either way, if the condemned individual wishes to have his
message broadcast, if the news media wishes to facilitate that broadcast,
and if citizens choose to watch that broadcast, then they should be able
to exercise that choice free from any unreasonable restrictions placed on
136. Weise, supra note 12, at 273.
137. Id. at272.
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them by the state.138
138. Id. at 272, 273; Cable News Network, supra note 4; Michael L. Radelet, Post-Furman Botched
Executions (last visited Feb. 16, 2001), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/botched.hn1.
